

**Secret**

25X1

# Sudanese Foreign Policy: The Search for Assistance

25X1

**EXACT COPY**

*NESA 83-10249*  
*October 1983*

Copy 322

**Page Denied**



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

**Secret**

25X1

# **Sudanese Foreign Policy: The Search for Assistance**

25X1

**An Intelligence Assessment**

This paper was prepared by [ ] Office  
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was  
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. [ ]

25X1

25X1

Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Branch, NESAC [ ]

25X1

25X1

**Secret**

*NESA 83-10249  
October 1983*

Secret

25X1

### Sudanese Foreign Policy: The Search for Assistance

25X1

#### Key Judgments

*Information available  
as of 7 September 1983  
was used in this report.*

Sudan's key foreign policy objectives are to obtain increased aid from virtually all potential donors except the Soviet Union, to counter threats of subversion from Libya and Ethiopia, and to attempt to weaken Soviet influence in the region. During the past several years, Khartoum has come to depend increasingly on Saudi Arabia for economic assistance, Egypt for military aid, and the United States for both. [ ]

25X1

Sudan repays its more important benefactors with political support and access to its military facilities. Sudan was one of only three Arab League states that did not sever ties with Cairo following the signing of the Camp David accords in 1978, and Khartoum has urged other Arabs to restore links with Egypt. Sudan recently concluded an agreement permitting the United States to pre-position military equipment in Port Sudan. Sudan serves Saudi Arabia as a barrier to the expansion of the Soviet role in northeast Africa and a conduit for aid to Eritrean groups fighting against the Ethiopian Government. [ ]

25X1

Sudan's relations with the Soviet Union have been cool since Sudanese Communists attempted to overthrow President Nimeiri in 1971. An apparent discreet diplomatic feeler by Moscow in late 1982 to improve bilateral relations was quickly squelched by Sudan's Foreign Minister. We believe a fundamental realignment toward the Soviet camp is unlikely as long as Nimeiri remains in power. [ ]

25X1

Sudanese leaders believe that the Soviet Union is encouraging Libya and Ethiopia to subvert the Nimeiri regime. [ ] both countries support Sudanese dissident groups that are dedicated to the overthrow of the current government and that constitute the principal external threat to the regime. [ ]

25X1

25X1

As long as the Nimeiri regime remains in power, Sudan is likely to maintain a favorable stance toward the United States. Relations could suffer, however, if:

- US aid is cut significantly.
- The Sudanese come to believe that the United States is pressing multilateral organizations to impose tough economic austerity measures on Khartoum.
- The Sudanese conclude that the United States is not doing enough to counter Libyan and Soviet moves in the Middle East and Africa. [ ]

25X1

Secret

NESA 83-10249  
October 1983

**Secret**  

25X1

Even if moderate tensions develop in bilateral relations, we doubt Nimeiri would curtail US military access to Sudanese facilities. In our judgment, Khartoum would continue to welcome such activities as the pre-positioning of US military equipment and the periodic deployment of AWACs as beneficial to its own security.

25X1  
Y

Nimeiri's most likely successors in an orderly transfer of power—those now at the top levels of the Army or the government—would probably continue his pro-US policies. If the regime were forced from office in an atmosphere of failure, however, US-Sudanese relations would probably suffer, at least in the short run.

25X1

In the less likely event that a government controlled by leftist parties, exiled dissidents, or radical junior officers came to power, we believe bilateral ties would worsen. Sudanese leftists have been critical of the United States, and most exiled dissident groups have links with Libya. Junior officers in the Army are a diverse group, but some have openly criticized Nimeiri's policies.

25X1  
Y**Secret**

Secret

25X1

### Sudanese Foreign Policy: The Search for Assistance

25X1

Sudanese foreign policy reflects the moderate personal beliefs of President Gaafar Nimeiri. We believe the President's views have been molded in large part by the nature of the external threats facing Sudan. For the first two years after Nimeiri came to power in 1969, Sudan's foreign policy was guided by vague ideological preconceptions modeled on Arab socialism as espoused by Egyptian President Nasir. Major foreign policy positions included hostility toward the United States as a supporter of Israel, a tendency to align with the Soviet Bloc, and a desire to strengthen ties with Egypt, Libya, and Syria.

A nearly successful Communist coup attempt in 1971 led to a 180-degree turn in Sudanese foreign policy. Nimeiri became distrustful of Moscow's intentions and gradually phased out Soviet assistance. To replace the Soviets, Nimeiri turned to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and in 1976 the United States for aid.

We believe that Nimeiri is particularly sensitive about potential military and subversive threats from Ethiopia and Libya because of Sudan's lengthy borders and the weakness of its armed forces. In public statements and conversations with US diplomats, he has expressed deep concern about Libyan and Ethiopian support for Sudanese dissidents. The Sudanese President's near paranoia about Soviet hostility causes him, in our judgment, to ascribe Libyan and Ethiopian actions largely to Moscow's influence.

#### Political Decision Making

Sudanese President Nimeiri makes all major decisions on Sudanese policy—foreign and domestic. We believe that he listens to advice from trusted aides but in the end does what he believes best, even in the face of unanimous opposition by his lieutenants. No one in the government, Peoples' Assembly, or Sudanese

Socialist Union—the sole legal political party—has any constitutional checks on his decisionmaking authority.

25X1

Nimeiri's decision to send a brigade of troops to Iraq in late 1982 typifies his determination to proceed with decisions despite widespread opposition from his advisers. The deployment of soldiers to Iraq was unpopular in both civilian and military circles,

25X1

25X1

25X1

Characteristically, Nimeiri went ahead with the deployment despite this resistance. Comments Nimeiri made to US diplomats last November suggest that he had hoped the Iraqis would cease their support for Sudanese dissidents in response to his action and apparently was willing to accept the risks involved.

25X1 25X1

Nimeiri, in our judgment, considers the views of significant domestic groups when formulating policy, but no civilian faction is powerful enough to move the

<sup>1</sup> According to reports from US Defense Department sources, Sudan's National Security Council is made up of eight key officials. Chaired by the President, its other members include the 1st Vice President, Chief of State Security, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Presidential Affairs, Inspector General of Police, and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Of these, we believe 1st Vice President and State Security Chief Umar Tayyib and Minister of Presidential Affairs Baha al-Din Idris wield the most influence with Nimeiri. Although not a full member of the NSC, Director of Military Intelligence Muhammad Ahmad al-Sir is also reported to have influence with Nimeiri on foreign policy matters. Whatever weight these men have primarily reflects the personal relationship each has established with the President.

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret



700240 (544712) 10-83

25X1

Secret

Secret

President from a strongly held position. Despite opposition from the leader of Sudan's Ansar Muslim sect, for example, Nimeiri supported the Camp David accords in 1978. According to our analysis, many of Sudan's non-Muslim southerners oppose closer ties to Egypt, but last year Nimeiri concluded an integration agreement with Cairo. In our view, the Sudanese military is the only group that has the power to convince Nimeiri to alter his views on foreign policy issues. The armed forces, however, have remained largely aloof from the decisionmaking process even in instances when they opposed a government decision, such as the dispatch of troops to Iraq. [REDACTED]

#### Major Benefactors

Sudan's need for economic and military assistance is a major determinant of its foreign policy. During the past several years, Khartoum has come to rely increasingly on Saudi Arabia for economic assistance, Egypt for military aid, and the United States for both. [REDACTED]

**Egypt.** Egypt is Sudan's closest ally and de facto protector. The two countries have deep geographic, economic, social, and cultural ties. Successive Egyptian leaders have said publicly that Egypt views a stable and friendly government in Sudan as a vital safeguard of the main tributaries of the Nile River. [REDACTED]

We believe that Cairo's main concern is that a regime sympathetic to its interests rule Sudan. The Egyptian Government is not strongly committed to the personal survival of Nimeiri. If a coup were launched by Sudanese whom Cairo believed were friendly toward Egypt, it might stay neutral. For the time being, however, the Egyptians probably see no feasible alternative to Nimeiri. [REDACTED]

The Sudanese Government usually turns to Egypt first when security threats arise. We believe Nimeiri places considerable value on the mutual defense pact signed with Egypt in July 1976 in the aftermath of a Libyan-backed coup attempt. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 25X1

Khartoum has never had to invoke the defense pact with Egypt, but a host of lesser Egyptian actions have helped bolster Sudan's security in recent years. Egypt sold 20 armored personnel carriers to Sudan in 1981, according to US Defense Department reports, and more are on order. Grant aid from Egypt has included a small number of T-54 and T-55 tanks, BM-21 rocket launchers, Swingfire antitank missiles, and 122-mm multiple rocket launchers, according to Defense Department publications and reports from the US Embassy and defense attache in Khartoum. [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] In addition, Egypt trains some Sudanese officers in Egypt, and approximately 200 Egyptian military instructors and technicians are stationed in Sudan. To the best of our knowledge, no Egyptian combat troops are stationed permanently in Sudan, despite claims to the contrary by opponents of the Nimeiri regime. [REDACTED] 25X1

Egypt and Sudan conduct periodic joint military exercises under the terms of their mutual defense pact and a protocol signed in December 1981. Such maneuvers have been used to warn potential foes of the Nimeiri regime. When Addis Ababa increased its support for Libyan-trained Sudanese dissidents in early 1982, Egypt scheduled a joint paratroop exercise near Sudan's border with Ethiopia. [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] The timing and location of the maneuvers constituted, in our judgment, an obvious message to Addis Ababa that Egypt would not tolerate a serious threat to Sudan's security. [REDACTED] 25X1

Secret



Secret

We believe that Egypt would go to considerable lengths to protect the Nimeiri regime from outside aggression. Nonetheless, the Sudanese President and his top military advisers are concerned that the Mubarak government might not respond to future requests for security assistance as quickly or forcefully as they would like. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A senior Sudanese military official complained to representatives of the US defense attache's office last spring that the Egyptians seemed reluctant to become involved in final plans to counter a possible Libyan attack on Khartoum in February 1983. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In our view, the Sudanese have concluded from this that they cannot depend fully on the Egyptians. [REDACTED]

The ambitious Egyptian-Sudanese integration agreement signed in 1982 has focused in large part on economic questions. The most tangible results of integration to date have been the lifting of restrictions on the movement of goods and people between the two countries. A joint development fund has been created within the integration framework, but we believe there is little the two financially strapped countries can do to aid each other economically. [REDACTED]

There are those in both countries who, in our estimation, oppose integration on economic grounds. Many in Egypt believe that the unification agreement binds them to a country whose economic problems are even worse than their own. Some Sudanese fear that integration will harm their relations with those Arab benefactors who still boycott Egypt but are favorably disposed toward Khartoum. [REDACTED]

**Saudi Arabia.** Our analysis suggests that the Saudi regime values the role that Nimeiri plays in limiting the expansion of Soviet influence in the Red Sea region and fears that he might be replaced by a radical, pro-Soviet regime. If Sudan were ruled by a leftist government, the Saudis would face a pro-Soviet arc stretching from Libya through Sudan and Ethiopia to South Yemen. [REDACTED]

The Saudis also see Sudan as a valuable conduit for assistance to Eritrean groups fighting against the Ethiopian Government. Riyadh and Khartoum have tried to unify rival Eritrean factions. [REDACTED]

Saudi Arabia is one of Sudan's largest single sources of financial aid. Our calculations indicate that aid disbursements from 1974 to 1980 totaled approximately \$2 billion, including \$1 billion in economic aid and some \$900 million in military assistance. Riyadh has committed another \$90 million in grants for 1983, according to the US Embassy in Jidda. The US Embassy in Khartoum has reported that, in a thinly disguised form of aid, Saudi Arabia agreed last year to purchase significant quantities of Sudanese sorghum at prices above world-market levels. [REDACTED]

We believe that Saudi Arabia, like Egypt, is determined that a moderate and sympathetic government rule Sudan but is not completely happy with Nimeiri. [REDACTED]

Despite these concerns, we believe the Saudis have concluded that the Nimeiri regime is the lesser of several evils. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the turmoil resulting from a change of government in Khartoum would involve significant risks to Saudi interests. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the kingdom will continue to aid the Nimeiri regime. The Saudis, however, appear to be providing Sudan only the minimum necessary to keep

25X1  
25X125X1  
25X125X1  
25X125X1  
25X1  
25X125X1  
25X125X1  
25X125X1  
25X1

25X1

Secret

**Table 1**  
**Official Aid Disbursements to Sudan,**  
**Projected 1983***Million US \$*

<b>Total</b>	<b>800</b>
Bilateral	553
Australia	2
Canada	13
Denmark	5
Finland	3
France	30
West Germany	50
India	8
Italy	26
Japan	22
Netherlands	24
Norway	7
Saudi Arabia	178
Spain	5
Switzerland	5
United Kingdom	35
United States	140
Multilateral	247
African Development Bank	10
Arab Fund	16
Arab Monetary Fund	50
European Community	41
International Fund for Agricultural Development	15
Islamic Development Bank	35
OPEC Fund	10
Saudi Fund	10
IBRD/IDA	60

the regime afloat. By disbursing their aid in a measured fashion, Riyadh, in our view, hopes that Khartoum will remain sensitive to its concerns on various regional issues and be more amenable to economic adjustment measures that the Saudis support.

We believe that the Saudis would prefer that Sudan be ruled by someone like Sadiq al-Mahdi, a leader of Sudan's fundamentalist Ansar Muslim sect, or Hasan al-Turabi, the head of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. In our judgment, however, they are aware that

**Table 2**  
**US Economic and Military Assistance**  
**to Sudan, FY 1981-84***Million US \$*

	1981 <sup>a</sup>	1982 <sup>a</sup>	1983 <sup>a</sup>	1984 <sup>b</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>157.3</b>	<b>276.2</b>	<b>261.5</b>	<b>329.5</b>
Economic	75.0	125.0	135.0	148.0
Military	32.3	51.2	44.3	61.5
MAP	1.7	0	43.0	60.0
FMS (credit)	30.0	50.0	0	0
IMET	0.6	1.2	1.3	1.5
ESF	50.0	100.0	82.2	120.0

<sup>a</sup> Actual disbursements.<sup>b</sup> Proposed commitments.

neither of these men has broad enough political support to win power. In any event, Riyadh has abstained from serious meddling in Sudanese internal politics.

**The United States.** Sudanese-US relations have grown close during the last several years, and US aid to Sudan increased significantly between 1975 and 1982. President Nimeiri has been one of the most open and vocal supporters of US foreign policy in the Arab world. In March 1981 he publicly offered the use of Sudan's military facilities to the United States. The Sudanese Government this year formally agreed to the pre-positioning of US equipment in Port Sudan for the Central Command. Last year President Nimeiri publicly approved the US Middle East peace initiative. Sudan also yielded in 1982 to US entreaties to accept some PLO combatants being evacuated from Beirut, despite apprehension that the guerrillas might create additional internal security problems for the government. In addition, Sudan has voted with the

Presidents Nimeiri and Reagan meet in Washington in November 1981. [REDACTED]



25X1

United States at the United Nations on many issues of major concern to Washington. During the 37th General Assembly, Sudan ranked among the African states that most often supported the United States on key issues. [REDACTED]

In addition to its direct assistance, the United States took a leading role in 1982 and 1983 in marshaling international economic support for Sudan. The US Government made demarches to Sudan's Western donors to secure the aid and debt relief measures necessary to narrow Sudan's balance-of-payments gap. [REDACTED]

America's role in encouraging multilateral financial assistance for Khartoum ironically became a source of some tension between the United States and Sudan. According to Embassy reporting, many Sudanese in and out of government were convinced that the United States actively urged the IMF to seek tough conditions for a new standby loan agreement for Sudan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The generous aid and debt-rescheduling packages subsequently arranged for the Sudanese eased but probably did not eliminate uncertainty in Khartoum about the extent of US support for Sudan. [REDACTED]

Sudanese officials also were disappointed by the drop in US aid to Sudan in 1983. Even before the magnitude of the cuts in military assistance became known, Foreign Minister Mirghani Mubarak complained in a published interview that the United States "isn't giving us military aid equivalent to the role Sudan is playing in Africa." We believe any further declines in aid levels will add to Sudanese disappointment. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

**China.** China has become an increasingly important secondary source of military equipment for Sudan in the last several years. We believe Beijing sees in Sudan an opportunity to maintain a presence in a part of Africa dominated by US and Soviet military assistance programs. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Over the last several years, the Chinese have provided 12 F-6 (MIG-19 variant) aircraft, 15 F-5s (MIG-17 variant), 95 tanks, field artillery, and other vehicles, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

[redacted] The Sudanese, in our judgment, are pleased to receive equipment from China, partly because Beijing has been patient about their tardiness in repaying the loans that financed the items. The US defense attache in Khartoum, moreover, has speculated that the Chinese charge Sudan below-market prices for military hardware. [redacted]

China also has a modest economic assistance program in Sudan. According to US Embassy reports, project aid for the construction of a highway, clothing factory, and vocational training center will be repaid in Sudanese goods. [redacted]

**Other Benefactors.** Western Europe, Japan, the smaller Persian Gulf states, Yugoslavia, and Romania have also given moderate levels of economic or military assistance to Sudan, according to US Embassy reports. We believe that the Western and Arabian Peninsula countries appreciate Sudan's role as a barrier to the spread of Soviet expansion in the Middle East and Africa. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are Sudan's biggest donors in the Gulf after Saudi Arabia. West Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Japan all have significant aid programs in Sudan. [redacted]

According to our analysis, Sudan's best relations among the East European states are with Yugoslavia and Romania. Khartoum is willing to maintain good ties with these Communist countries, in our judgment, because it views Yugoslavia as independent and Romania as having a greater degree of independence in foreign policy than other East European nations. Yugoslavia fulfills an especially important role by supplying parts and maintaining Sudan's aging Soviet-built military equipment. [redacted]

#### **Nimeiri's Rogues' Gallery**

President Nimeiri's public statements have made clear that he considers the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East and northeast Africa to be a threat to regional stability and to his own survival. The Sudanese have long believed that Moscow encourages Libya and Ethiopia to support Sudanese dissidents who want to overthrow Nimeiri. [redacted]

**Soviet Union.** Relations with the Soviet Union have been poor since Sudanese Communists tried to overthrow Nimeiri in 1971. Statements Nimeiri has made to US officials and the press display his conviction that the Soviets seek to remove him as a step toward their goal of dominating the Persian Gulf/Red Sea area. We believe the Soviets would like to see a less pro-US government in Sudan, but we have no evidence to confirm Sudanese suspicions that the USSR was directly involved in the 1971 coup attempt or the Libyan-backed attempt in 1976. We do not have any evidence that the Soviet Union is now directly involved in Libyan- and Ethiopian-supported efforts to destabilize the Sudanese Government, although the Soviets undoubtedly are sympathetic to this goal as it would further overall Soviet objectives in the region. [redacted]

We believe that as long as Nimeiri is in power, there is little chance that Sudan's relations with the Soviet Union will improve dramatically. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Libya and Ethiopia.** We believe Libyan and Ethiopian support for Sudanese dissident groups constitutes the most serious external threat to the Nimeiri regime.<sup>3</sup> [redacted]

[redacted] Qadhafi's hostility to Nimeiri, originally a reflection of his desire to strike at Egypt through its weaker neighbor, has developed into a strong personal antipathy, in our judgment. Qadhafi supported coup attempts against Nimeiri in 1975 and 1976 and redoubled his efforts after Nimeiri endorsed the Camp David accords in 1978. Since 1981, our analysis suggests, Qadhafi's hatred of the Sudanese ruler has been aggravated by direct Sudanese support for exiled Libyan opposition groups. Sudan's recent role in allowing US aircraft into Sudan to monitor Libyan-backed antigovernment activity in Chad probably has further intensified Qadhafi's desire to overthrow Nimeiri. [redacted]

Sudanese officials are particularly worried about the potential expansion of Libyan influence in Chad.

[redacted] a Chadian Government sympathetic to Libyan demands would allow Libyan forces or Sudanese dissidents to use eastern Chad as a staging ground for attacks into western Sudan. A contingent of at least 450 Sudanese dissidents fought alongside Chadian rebels attempting to overthrow the Habre government last summer. [redacted]

Ethiopia intensified its support for Sudanese dissidents after it joined the Aden Pact with Libya and South Yemen in 1981. [redacted]

[redacted] in our view, Ethiopian leaders do not share Qadhafi's intense hatred of Nimeiri. Nonetheless, they are convinced that Sudan is aiding Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents. [redacted]

Over the years, Sudan and Ethiopia have attempted to persuade each other to cease aid to each other's opponents, according to [redacted] press reports. If Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu perceived a

decrease in Sudanese support for Eritrean and Tigrean rebels, or if Libya were to renege on aid commitments made to Ethiopia as part of the Aden Pact, Mengistu might curb the activities of Sudanese dissidents based in his country. We believe that the Ethiopians would not stop the anti-Nimeiri dissident activity altogether, however, because they view the rebels as an important bargaining card against the Sudanese. [redacted]

**Other Neighbors.** None of Sudan's other neighbors—Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, the Central African Republic, or Chad—are hostile toward Khartoum. Several of these states, however, are ruled by unstable governments. Sudanese officials, therefore, are concerned that these countries might become havens for Sudanese dissidents or sources of refugees fleeing strife in their own countries. [redacted]

#### Outlook

In our view, the prospects are good that with sustained effort Sudan will continue to garner the foreign support it needs to survive. We believe, for example, that, despite aid cutbacks to other African states necessitated by falling oil revenues, Saudi assistance to Sudan will not drop significantly, because the geographic proximity of the two countries makes Sudan more important to the Saudis. Other friendly states will probably provide modest levels of aid. Egyptian policymakers at the highest levels continue to reaffirm their determination to defend Sudan from external attack both in public and, according to sources of the US defense attache in Cairo, in private. [redacted]

Although Sudan's foreign relations are driven by the pursuit of foreign assistance, we believe Nimeiri aspires to play a larger, more statesmanlike role in both the Middle East and Africa. A committed moderate, Nimeiri is often among the first to suggest meetings of the Arab League or OAU to solve regional problems. Sudan's influence in these forums

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

is limited, however, because of its economic and military weakness, its internal instability, and its location on the fringes of both the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa. [ ]

with Nimeiri, they might temper their pro-Western inclinations to bolster Sudan's standing among non-aligned countries and mollify those Sudanese critical of Nimeiri's close association with Washington. [ ]

25X1

25X1

#### Implications for the United States

We believe the Nimeiri regime is unlikely to change its pro-US stance. Nimeiri, in our view, would probably welcome US AWACS back to Khartoum in the event of Libyan-backed adventurism in northeast Africa, especially in Chad. We believe the Nimeiri government will continue to agree with US positions on many other regional issues. [ ]

In the less likely event that a government controlled by leftist parties, exiled dissidents, or radical junior officers came to power, we believe that US-Sudanese relations would worsen. The Sudanese Communist Party and other smaller leftist groups have propagandized heavily against US activities in Sudan. Most exiled dissident factions have links to Libya and, in our view, would probably align themselves with Tripoli in the unlikely event they succeeded in ousting Nimeiri. The US defense attache's office in Khartoum reported last year that some junior officers had become openly critical of the Nimeiri regime. If a group of these younger officers overthrew the President, we believe the new government might be less supportive of the United States and could turn to Libya and the Soviet Union for aid. [ ]

25X1

25X1

There are several potential developments that could damage the currently warm Sudanese-US bilateral relationship. Significant cuts in US aid would deeply upset Sudanese officials. Drastic reductions in assistance might convince the government to reverse its policy of refusing economic aid from the Soviet Union. We believe the Sudanese would also be annoyed if they became convinced that the United States was trying to impose tough economic austerity measures on Sudan through the IMF. Sudanese confidence in Washington also would be shaken if they came to believe that the United States was not doing enough to combat what they perceive as Soviet and Libyan adventurism in the Middle East and Africa. [ ]

25X1

Even if moderate strains develop in US-Sudanese relations, however, we do not believe the Nimeiri regime would significantly reduce US military access to Sudanese facilities. The Sudanese, in our judgment, see such American involvement as bolstering their own security and therefore would continue to welcome it. [ ]

25X1

If Nimeiri were to turn power over to a handpicked successor, we believe bilateral relations would remain largely unaffected. The most likely candidates, those now serving at the highest levels of the military or the government, in our judgment share Nimeiri's pro-US orientation. [ ]

25X1

If Nimeiri were forced from office involuntarily, his successors might be less favorably inclined toward the United States. Even if normally pro-US senior Army officers were to seize power because of dissatisfaction

Secret

**Secret**

**Secret**